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ABSTRACT 
In this article we develop a new model of bodily integrity that we designate ‘embodied 
integrity’. We deploy it to argue that non-therapeutic interventions on children should be considered 
within a decision-making framework that prioritises embodied integrity. This would counter the 
excessive decision-making power that law currently accords to parents, protecting the child’s 
immediate and future interests. Focusing on legal responses to genital cutting, we suggest that current 
legal understandings of bodily integrity are impoverished and problematic. By contrast, adoption of an 
‘embodied integrity’ model carves out a space for children’s rights, while avoiding these negative 
consequences. We propose that embodied integrity should trump competing values in any best interests 
assessment where a non-therapeutic intervention is requested. Drawing on Drucilla Cornell and Joel 
Feinberg’s theories we argue that protecting a child’s embodied integrity is essential to guarantee 
his/her right to make future embodied choices and become a fully individuated person. 
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While children’s rights are now well established in UK and international law,  there remains 
uncertainty about their parameters.  In particular,  controversy continues to surround the right of 
parents to take irrevocable non-therapeutic decisions on behalf of children who lack competence to 
decide for themselves. In this article we explore the limits that law does and should impose on 
parental rights to make irreversible decisions about surgically modifying their children’s bodies in the 
absence of a clear therapeutic rationale.1  Specifically, we seek to contest ‘the extraordinary power’2  
that law accords parents in this situation, and, in so doing, to examine the potential of bodily integrity 
discourse to constrain or limit such power, thereby generating the space for a more complete 
realisation of children’s rights.  The concept of bodily integrity underpins a range of legal doctrines 
and this discourse has been prominent in recent legal debates at national and supra-national level, and 
in the framing of professional guidance.  Indeed, Margaret Brazier has suggested that bodily integrity 
may constitute the ‘core legal value’ underpinning contemporary health law.3  While recognising the 
power of this discourse, we argue that it is problematic to position bodily integrity as conventionally 
understood as a core legal value given its indeterminacy and cultural contingency, as well as the 
gendered and racialised ways it operates in practice. We suggest that many non-therapeutic ‘embodied 
practices’4 including removal of reproductive organs, non-therapeutic normalising surgery on intersex 
bodies, blepharoplasty, limb lengthening, modifying the facial features of children born with Downs 
Syndrome and so forth, prompt concern about the surgical shaping of children. However, we agree 
with Francesca Ammaturo that ‘the ramifications of the “right to bodily integrity” in connection to 
FGC, circumcision and intersex “normalising surgeries” are numerous and deserve particular 
                                                
1 Clearly the designation therapeutic or non-therapeutic is contested. For example, whilst some cases of male 
genital cutting (considered below) are performed for therapeutic reasons (notably phimosis), in other instances 
the claims of therapeutic benefit have been seen to be heavily culturally dependent. See, for example, M. Frisch, 
et al. ‘Cultural Bias in the AAP’s 2012 Technical Report and Policy Statement on Male Circumcision’ [2013] 
131 Pediatrics 796.  
2 A. Ouellette, ‘Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies’ (2010) 85 Indiana LJ 955, p. 956. 
3 M. Brazier, ‘Introduction: Being Human: Of Liberty and Privilege’ in The Legal, Medical and Cultural 
Regulation of the Body: Transformation and Transgression, S. Smith and R. Deazley eds. (2009) 1, at 7. 
4 The term is Carolyn Pedwell’s. She uses it to interrogate “those habits, rituals or performances that are 
oriented specifically towards intervening in and/or altering ‘the body’”, C. Pedwell, Feminism, Culture and 
Embodied Practice: The rhetorics of comparison (2010) 132, n. 1.  
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attention.’5  Consequently, in this article we focus on legal responses to the genital cutting of children, 
and on the revealing language in which such interventions are debated.  These procedures are 
typically performed for non-medical reasons, are effectively irreversible, are likely to cause some 
form of bodily harm and, in extreme cases, to result in death.  In most cases they will be performed on 
children who clearly lack the capacity to consent.  Importantly, for our purposes they also 
demonstrate how parental decision-making can be shaped by considerations of gender, religion and 
culture to which law responds in variable and inconsistent ways.6 We contrast recent high profile 
campaigns in the UK demanding that the criminal prohibition of female genital cutting (FGC) be 
legally enforced with the continuing legal and social tolerance of the genital cutting of boys (MGC).  
Analysing how bodily integrity arguments have been differently mobilised in debates about cutting 
children, and the contrasting legal responses to these claims, offers particularly valuable insights into 
both the potential and limitations of traditional notions of bodily integrity, given ‘the complex web of 
cultural, religious and social factors intervening in the perpetuation of [these] practices’.7 
 
We argue that traditional understandings of the concept - which we term conventional bodily 
integrity - are grounded in a mind/body dichotomy that prioritises the physical body, conceptualised as 
bounded territory or property to be policed and defended against the encroachment of others.  When 
accepted by courts and legislators such constructions tend to result in punitive responses.  Instead we 
posit a reformulated conception of embodied integrity. Our approach enriches conventional accounts 
by integrating physical and psychological dimensions of integrity in recognition of the child’s emerging 
legal subjectivity. We view the embodied integrity conception that we flesh out in this article as better 
equipped than conventional understandings to guide health decision-making. Our model serves to 
problematise excessive parental choice; yet, grounded in a nuanced and relational approach to the 
                                                
5 F. Ammaturo, ‘Intersexuality and the “Right to Bodily Integrity”: Critical Reflections on Female Genital 
Cutting, Circumcision and Intersex “Normalising Surgeries” in Europe’ (2016) 25 Social & Legal Studies 591 at 
598. 
6 Our argument could be extended to other forms of non-surgical interventions, including, for instance, 
vaccination or tooth extraction to fit orthodontic braces. However, for the reasons we identify, focusing on 
surgical modification of the genitalia is particularly illuminating. We thank an anonymous referee for clarifying 
our thinking on this point. 
7 Ammaturo, op. cit. n.5, p. 593. 
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child’s emerging legal subjecthood, it eschews an overtly punitive approach which we see as 
counterproductive. Furthermore, our concept of embodied integrity resonates with recent shifts in UK 
health law which recognise legal subjects as embodied, understand clinical interventions as biographical 
rather than simply bodily events, and stress the need to clearly articulate the rationale for judgments 
about best interests. 
 
We begin by outlining how bodily integrity discourse has been mobilised in recent debates 
about genital cutting, and the legal implications when such arguments are accepted. We then turn to 
judicial pronouncements on the concept, analysing rulings applicable to the bodies of children who are 
too young to consent.8  While acknowledging its value, we highlight the problematic aspects of 
conventional integrity approaches. We next trace an emerging jurisprudence that hints at something 
akin to our reformulated vision of embodied integrity, but argue that these tentative dicta require further 
development. To address this we draw on Drucilla Cornell’s analysis of bodily integrity and Joel 
Feinberg’s articulation of a child’s right to an open future, arguing that together they provide a 
compelling justification for making embodied integrity central to determining the legitimacy of non-
therapeutic bodily interventions on children who are too young to consent.  While we focus on genital 
cutting as a particularly revealing case study, our revisioning of bodily integrity doctrine has wider 
implications for health decision-making and judgments about children’s best interests, and indeed - as 
the value is increasingly invoked - for legal understandings of bodily integrity in general. 
 
THE GENDERED POLITICS OF GENITAL CUTTING 
 
Genital cutting of girls has recently attracted widespread media attention and condemnation by 
prominent political figures in the UK. The cutting of male children, by contrast, remains strikingly 
                                                
8 Clearly different issues arise when a child is old enough to participate in decision-making and at pp. xx below 
we argue for these sorts of irreversible interventions to be deferred until the child is competent to decide, thus 
respecting her emerging autonomy. Furthermore, for reasons of space, our focus is on jurisprudential arguments 
rather than the professional codes which guide clinicians, although clearly such guidance has significant 
practical bearing on decisions about children’s bodies. 
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absent from UK debates over genital cutting. This exemplifies how the two practices are dramatically 
separated in the public imagination and in theoretical accounts.9  Matthew Johnson, for example, 
demonstrates how Martha Nussbaum applies bodily integrity analysis asymmetrically to male and 
female cutting, attributing this to ‘culturally particular beliefs concerning sexuality, physiology and 
gender relations’ and a paradigmatic concern for religious toleration.10  We agree that bodily integrity 
is valorised or disregarded according to a complex matrix encompassing the subject’s gender, race, 
religion and culture, and, crucially, how far that culture is perceived as mainstream – a perspective that 
Nikki Sullivan attributes to ‘white optics’.11  In consequence, Anglo-American law regulates male and 
female cutting within different legal paradigms.12 Thus, while tort claims for damages against 
practitioners have succeeded in jurisdictions where MGC is legally tolerated,13 few cases have squarely 
confronted the legality of the practice, and certainly not within the paradigm of criminal law that 
governs the cutting of females. Even where death has resulted, until recently no criminal prosecutions 
have been instituted, notwithstanding recorded negligence or malpractice.14 English jurisprudence 
scrutinising circumcision decision-making is limited to three Court of Appeal and two Family Court 
rulings,15 while in the US a single State Supreme Court ruling exists.16  In three of the five cases the 
procedure was questioned only because of parental disagreement, the others concerned a dispute 
                                                
9 D. Davies, ‘Male and female genital alteration: A collision course with the law’ (2001) 11 Health Matrix: 
Journal of Law-Medicine 487. 
10 M. Johnson, ‘Male genital mutilation: Beyond the tolerable?’ (2010) 10 Ethnicities 181 at 202. 
11 N. Sullivan, ‘“The price we pay for our common good?": Genital Modification and the Somatechnologies of 
Cultural (In)Difference' (2007) 17 Social Semiotics 395. 
12 M. Fox and M. Thomson, ‘Foreskin is a feminist issue’ (2009) 24 Australian Feminist Studies 195. 
13 These include, in the US, Doe v Raezer 664 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. Ct 1995); Felice v Valeylab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 
920 (La. Ct. App. 1987). In the UK see Iqbal v Irfan [1994] CLY 164; B (A Child) v Southern Hospital NHS Trust 
[2003] 3QR 9. Of course, many cases are settled out of court. 
14 In 2012, a nurse in Manchester was found guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence after a four-week-old boy 
died following a botched circumcision performed without anaesthetic and for payment  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-20733674 (last visited 14 February 2017). Perhaps 
significantly given the importance of white optics, both the defendant and the child’s parents were originally from 
Nigeria where the practice is common.  
15 Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) [2000] 1 FLR 571 (CA) 576; 
Re S (Change of Names: Cultural Factors) [2001] 3 FCR 648 (Fam); Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religion: 
Circumcision [2004] EWHC 1282 (Fam), [2004] EWCA Civ 1257 (CA). We have analysed this case law in 
detail elsewhere – M. Fox and M. Thomson ‘Short Changed? The Law and Ethics of Male Circumcision (2005) 
13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 161. More recently the Family Court considered the issue in cases 
In the Matter of A (A Child) (unreported, 2015) and Re L and B (Children) (Specific Issues: Temporary Leave to 
Remove from the Jurisdiction; Circumcision) [2016] EWHC 849 (Fam). 
16 Boldt v Boldt 334 Ore 1. 76 P.3d 388 (2008), M. Fox, and M. Thomson, ‘Older Minors and Circumcision: 
Questioning the Limits of Religious Actions’ (2008) 9 Medical Law International 283. 
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between the parents and the local authority in the exercise of its parental responsibility.  Each court 
limited its holding narrowly to the facts, implicitly assuming the legality of the practice where both 
parents agree. Indeed, ironically the effect of legal challenges has been to entrench MGC as a legitimate 
choice for parents, justifiable in the best interests of the child. Such rulings demonstrate the wide 
discretion that parents or those accorded parental responsibility under the Children Act 1989 have.  Of 
course, as Brazier and Cave point out, law does limit parental powers to consent. As they note, if 
parents: 
 
“propose to authorise some irreversible or drastic measure [they cite sterilisation as an 
example], their authorisation alone will not make that measure lawful.  It must be shown to be 
in the child’s interests.”17 
 
However, much turns on what counts as ‘drastic’ and – as we shall explore below – how the child’s 
interests are assessed. In our view such judgments are culturally determined. Thus, in the 2015 Family 
Court case In the Matter of A (a Child) (unreported, 2015) where Gareth Jones J denied an application 
by Muslim parents for a declaration that their six year old child who was in the care of the local authority 
be circumcised, he noted that “[o]rdinarily of course a parent exercising his or her parental responsibility 
would be authorised to provide consent for a child's circumcision on either a health or a religious 
basis.”18 Such dicta highlight the wide-ranging powers accorded to parents to bring children up in their 
choice of religion and to make irreversible decisions on their behalf if these accord with societal norms.  
They demonstrate Katherine O’Donovan’s argument that, although the legislation sought to focus on 
parents’ responsibilities towards the child rather than their rights over the child, by structuring family 
law in terms of parental responsibility, it has failed to accord legal subjectivity to children.19  Moreover, 
as Bridgeman notes, case law has been particularly hesitant in recognising the agency of younger 
children,20 thereby strengthening parental powers over children deemed too young to consent. As 
                                                
17 M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law 6th edition (2016), p. 458. 
18 In the Matter of A (a Child), op. cit. n.15, para 57. 
19 K. O’Donovan, Family Law Matters (1993), Chapter 6. 
20 J. Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, Young Children and Healthcare Law (2012), p. 7. 
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Archard and Macleod have suggested, the child is conceived as “if not precisely a thing to be owned… 
in some sense, an extension of the parent.”21 
 
Legal tolerance of infringements of the bodily integrity of boys through routine cutting of their 
bodies for religious or social reasons contrasts with the premium placed on preserving the bodily 
integrity of girls (responding to a social process whereby in/vulnerability is gendered and racialised).22 
Consequently, cutting female genitalia is perceived as analogous to other criminal violations, such as 
rape.  As Ruth Miller observes, such practices are constituted as acts of bodily harm. They are 
‘conceived of as a violation of bodily integrity [which]… undermine an individual’s (biopolitical) 
dignity’.23 This deployment of the discourse of harm, violation and mutilation has important legal 
implications.  On a global level, statements from bodies such as the UN, WHO, and UNICEF clearly 
position FGC as a breach of a woman’s bodily integrity, and thus an international human rights 
violation. The Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in 2002, for example, 
identified the procedure as one of several familial cultural practices which violate women’s human right 
to bodily integrity.24  The centrality of bodily or physical integrity to prohibitions on FGC was restated 
in the 2008 Interagency Statement,25 and reiterated by the WHO in February 2012.26 Furthermore, not 
only is the parental choice to surgically alter the genitalia of a female child radically circumscribed; law 
in the UK and some Australian states also precludes adult women electing to have their genitals cut.27 
Consequently, the invocation of bodily integrity in arguments opposing FGC allows little space for 
countervailing narratives, and legitimates an unusually sweeping and punitive legal response.  For 
instance, in November 2012 a ‘Female Genital Mutilation Action Plan’ was launched in the UK to 
                                                
21 D. Archard and C.M. Macleod, The Moral and Political Status of Children (2002), p. 1. 
22 M. Thomson, ‘A Tale of Two Bodies: The Male Body and Feminist Legal Theory’ in Transcending the 
Boundaries of Law (2011) M. Fineman ed. 143. 
23 R.A. Miller, The Limits of Bodily Integrity: Abortion, Adultery and Rape Legislation in Comparative 
Perspective (2007) at 113. 
24 UN Cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women: Report of the Special Rapporteur, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy. UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 12(a). UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/48, p. 3. 
25 WHO, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, 
UNECA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO (WHO: Geneva, 2008). 
26 WHO, Fact Sheet No. 241 Female Genital Mutilation. February 2012. 
27 Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003; for the Australian position see A. Kennedy, ‘Beautification and 
Mutilation’ (2009) 20 Australian Feminist Studies 211. 
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address the lack of prosecutions since FGC was criminalised in 1985.  It contained commitments to 
gather more robust data on allegations of FGC, to identify issues that might hinder investigations and 
prosecutions, to explore the prosecution of the offence in other jurisdictions and to examine whether it 
could be more readily prosecuted under different legislation, such as the Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Acts (DVCVA) 2004 (as amended).  The Plan also sought to ensure closer liaison between 
police and prosecutors throughout investigations.28  The wide-ranging discussion prompted by this 
policy has seen FGC characterised as an ‘unpunished crime’, and intensified scrutiny of parents who 
elect to have their female children cut - usually abroad - and of doctors who facilitate it.29 As David 
Fraser correctly predicted in relation to such strategies in Australia: 
 
Those most likely to feel the effects of criminalisation  and the exclusion which accompanies 
the process… are already excluded by the colour of their skin and their place in diaspora from 
Australia and their country of origin.30 
 
The first high profile UK prosecution resulted in March 2013.31 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
deemed it in the public interest to prosecute Dr Dhanuson Dharmasena, under s.1 of the 2003 Act, when 
he reinfibulated at her request a patient who had earlier been genitally cut.32  In February 2015 
Dharmasena and Hasan Mohammed, who was charged with encouraging and aiding and abetting the 
offence, were unanimously acquitted. Dr Dharmasena invoked the defence of necessity, since until the 
woman entered emergency labour he was unaware that she had been cut, had received no training in 
dealing with FGC, and believed that restitching her to prevent bleeding was in her best interests. 
                                                
28 CPS Website, latest news, 23 November 2012 (last visited 14 February 2017). 
29 Campaigners have cited values such as ‘physical autonomy’ as justifying prosecutions which have proven 
controversial. J. Gillespie and H. Summers ‘Prosecutors weigh up female mutilation trials’ Sunday Times 7 July 
2013; S. Laville, “First FGM prosecution: how the case came to court” Guardian, 4 February 2015. Such 
campaigns and evidence of the prevalence of FGM in the UK (A. Topping, “FGM: more than 1,7000 women 
and girls treated by NHS since April” Guardian, 16 October 2014) have also prompted tougher legislation – e.g. 
Serious Crimes Act 2015. 
30 D. Fraser, ‘Heart of Darkness: The Criminalisation of Female Genital Mutilation’ (1994) 6 Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 148, p. 150. 
31 First prosecutions for female genital mutilation’ CPS website latest news 21 March 2014 (last visited 14 
February 2017). 
32 M. Evans, ‘Doctor becomes first person in Britain charged with performing a FGM procedure’ Telegraph, 21 
March 2013. 
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Sweeney J observed that the doctor ‘had been badly let down by a number of systematic failures which 
were no fault of his own at the Whittington hospital’.33  Yet notwithstanding this prominent failure, 
measures to tackle FGC continued apace.34  The Guardian newspaper launched a high profile anti-FGC 
campaign in February 2014,35 which attracted support from the UN,36 and a pledge from Prime Minister 
David Cameron for new legislation to end the practice.37  This led to the enactment of ss.70-75 of the 
Serious Crime Act 2015 which amended the 2003 legislation. S. 72 creates a new offence of failing to 
protect girl from risk of genital mutilation, while s. 73 empowers courts to issue Female Genital 
Mutilation Protection Orders ‘for the purposes of (a) protecting a girl against the commission of a 
genital mutilation offence, or (b) protecting a girl against whom any such offence has been committed’. 
A number of such orders have been issued in cases where the court was satisfied that there was a risk 
of a child being taken abroad for the procedure.38 S. 74 of the 2015 legislation controversially imposes 
responsibilities on halth professionals to report FGC and family histories thereof.39 In September 2016 
a House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Report revealed that in the year to March 2016 5,702 
new cases of FGM were recorded on women and girls in England, with at least 18 procedures having 
been performed in the UK.  It castigated the “lamentable record and the failure to identify cases, to 
prosecute and to achieve convictions”, which it compared unfavourably to France and other EU 
jurisdictions,40 and recommended that the Department of Health take a stronger line with health 
professionals who did not comply with their mandatory reporting responsibilities under the 2015 
                                                
33 id. 
34 Significantly, however, there have been no further prosecutions. Similar pro-criminalisation imperatives in 
Australia have recently resulted in a successful prosecution. A New South Wales court sentenced a retired 
midwife, a mother of two girls who had been subjected to either Type 1 or Type IV cutting, and a Dawoodi 
Bohra community leader to the maximum sentence of 15 months in prison in March 2016 – see “Three 
sentenced to 15 months in landmark female genital mutilation trial’, Guardian, 18 March 2016. 
35 ‘FGM campaigner Fahma Mohamed urges Gove to help end cycle of abuse’, Guardian, 25 February 2014. 
36 ‘Ban Ki-moon puts UN weight behind Guardian-based FGM campaign’, Guardian, 4 March 2014. 
37 Editorial, ‘The Guardian view on the campaign to end female genital mutilation: keep up the momentum’, 
Guardian, 27 July 2014. 
38 Re E (Children) (Female Genital Mutilation Protection Orders) [2015] EWHC 2275 (Fam), though cf  CE v. 
NE (2016) EWHC 1052 (Fam); Re F and X (Children) [2015] EWHC 2653 (Fam); Chief Constable v. S 
(February 2016, unreported). 
39 See M. Jefferson, ‘FGM/Cutting: Contexualising Recent Legal Developments’ (2015) 78 Journal of Criminal 
Law 411. 
40 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Female Genital Mutilation: Abuse Unchecked, Ninth Report 
of Session 2016-17 (HC 390) at 25. 
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legislation.41 This concerted political and legal response to FGC contrasts sharply with the ongoing 
silence and lack of action to address harms occasioned by MGC.  Yet, as the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association (KNMG) viewpoint document on non-therapeutic circumcision noted in 2010, many 
complications have been associated with MGC, including: ‘infections, bleeding, sepsis, necrosis, 
fibrosis of the skin, urinary tract infections, meningitis, herpes infections, meatisis, meatal stenosis, 
necrosis and necrotising complications, all of which have led to the complete amputation of the penis. 
Deaths have also been reported.’42 
 
Recently, the dichotomy in responses to the two procedures was challenged by Sir James 
Munby who acknowledged that they can cause comparable degrees of harm.43  Re B and G concerned 
care proceedings brought by Leeds City Council in the case of B, a 4-year-old boy, and G, a 3-year-old 
girl, who allegedly had been subjected to FGC. It was accepted by the court that if G had indeed been 
genitally cut, then it was Type IV (using the typology set out by the WHO and others in 200844). Type 
IV is defined as ‘all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for 
example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization.’  Although he concluded that the 
evidence did not support the Council’s claim, Munby J nevertheless considered whether Type IV 
constituted ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of the Children Act 1989 - thereby satisfying the 
threshold test to begin care proceedings under s. 31.  Having characterised FGC as ‘an abuse of human 
rights… a “barbarous” practice which is “beyond the pale”’,45 he then positioned WHO Types I, II and 
III as ‘more invasive than male circumcision’.46  However, significantly, Munby acknowledged that 
some forms of Type IV are ‘on any view much less invasive than male circumcision’,47 and noted that 
Type Ia (removal of the clitoral hood or prepuce) ‘is physiologically somewhat analogous to male 
                                                
41 id, p.23. 
42 KNMG, Non-therapeutic Circumcision of Male Minors. Utrecht: KNMG, 2010 (http:// 
www.knmg.nl/jongensbesnijdenis) (last visited 14 February 2017). p. 8. 
43 In the matter of B and G (Children) (No 2) [2015] EWFC 3, at para 59-60. 
44 OCHR et al, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: an interagency statement (2008)  
45 B and G op. cit., n.43, para 54-5. 
46 id., para 60. 
47 id. 
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circumcision’.48  Having thus stressed the comparability of harm and accepted that all forms of FGC 
constitute ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of care proceedings, Munby asserted that: 
 
Given the comparison between what is involved in male circumcision and FGM TYPE IV, to 
dispute that the more invasive procedure involves the significant harm involved in the less 
invasive procedure would seem almost irrational. In my judgement, if Type IV amounts to 
significant harm, as in my judgement it does, then the same must be so of male circumcision.49 
However, he then reciled from the implications of his argument that MGC constituted ‘significant 
harm’, noting that once this threshold test under section 31 is met, the issue for the court becomes a test 
of ‘reasonable parenting’.  This allows the practices to be differentiated: 
It is at this point in the analysis… that the clear distinction between FGM and male circumcision 
appears. Whereas it can never be reasonable parenting to inflict any form of FGM on a child, 
the position is quite different with male circumcision. Society and law… are prepared to tolerate 
non-therapeutic circumcision… while no longer willing to tolerate FGM in any of its forms.50 
Yet, these ‘common sense’ assumptions used to distinguish MGC and FGC are increasingly contested,51 
and, as Theodore Bennett writes, a number of overlapping ‘discursive techniques… are employed to 
construct and maintain the dissimilarities between’ male and female genital cutting.52 Elsewhere in 
Europe, meanwhile, similar logic to that underpinning Munby’s judgment has prompted more radical 
conclusions.  In 2012 the District Court of Cologne controversially decreed that a child’s bodily 
integrity was implicated where a physician circumcised a four-year old boy at his parents’ request.53 
Two days later the child haemorrhaged and was admitted to the children's emergency ward of a local 
                                                
48 id., n.1. 
49 id., para 69. The harm of circumcision was also acknowledged by Gareth Jones J In the Matter of A (a Child), 
op. cit. note 15, para 75. He characterised it as “an invasive and painful medical procedure… which A might not 
fully appreciate the need for and which would inflict a degree of pain, trauma and an aftermath of discomfort’. 
50 id., para. 72. 
51 See, e.g., B. Earp, J. Hendry and M. Thomson, ‘Everyday paradoxes and the “almost irrational” in medical 
and family law’ (forthcoming). 
52 T. Bennett, Cuts and Criminality: Body Alteration in Legal Discourse (2015) p.68. Elsewhere we have sought 
to contest these ‘common sense’ assumptions in legal discourse – Fox and Thomson, op. cit, n. 15. 
53 Landgericht Koln (Cologne District Court), Judgment on May 7 (2012) No. 151 Ns 169/11. 
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hospital, leading the Public Prosecutor's Office to press charges against the circumciser. The Local 
Court held the procedure to be lawful, but, on appeal, the District Court found that cutting a boy for 
religious reasons caused impermissible bodily injury and breached his right to physical integrity and 
self-determination. The ruling was clear that neither parental rights nor freedom of religion, as 
guaranteed by the Basic Law, could justify such cutting, and that circumcision amounted to ‘serious 
and irreversible impairment of physical integrity’.  Leave to appeal was denied. 
 
The Cologne ruling incited international controversy. While most responses were hostile,54 the 
case did prompt calls for a ban in neighbouring jurisdictions.55 These arguments have subsequently 
gained ground, particularly in Nordic countries.56 Reflecting an emerging unease about the procedure 
in northern European jurisdictions, the Cologne case was heard in the wake of the guidance by the 
KNMG we noted above, which adopted an unusually strong stance against MGC explicitly grounded 
in physical integrity: 
 
The child is not only protected by the right to religious freedom, but also by the right to physical 
integrity. This right, as laid down in Article 11 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the ECHR, 
is one of the most important basic rights.57 
 
In Germany and the Netherlands challenges to parental rights to cut children were grounded in 
constitutionally protected rights to physical integrity and self-determination. While powerful, these 
seem principally concerned with policing the boundaries of the physical body, along the lines of the 
                                                
54 Most attention focused on the issue of religious freedoms. See, e.g. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/circumcision-ban-is-the-worst-attack-on-jews-since-
holocaust-7939593.html; (last visited 14 February 2017). 
55 V. Fortier (ed) La circoncision rituelle (2016). 
56 See, e.g., ‘Let the boys decide on circumcision: Joint statement from the Nordic Ombudsmen for Children and 
paediatric experts’ http://www.crin.org/docs/English-statement-.pdf (30 September 2013) (last visited 14 
February 2017). 
57 KNMG, Non-therapeutic Circumcision of Male Minors. Utrecht: KNMG, 2010 (http:// 
www.knmg.nl/jongensbesnijdenis) (last visited 14 February 2017). p. 13 para 5. Calls for action against 
circumcision have also surfaced in other European countries. See, e.g., http://www.businessinsider.com/a-
norwegian-political-party-has-called-for-a-ban-on-religious-circumcision-2012-6#ixzz1xksT00Uw (last visited 
14 February 2017). 
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conventional bodily integrity model we will outline below. We attribute the controversy generated by 
the Cologne case, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands guidance, to the widespread (though faltering) 
common sense acceptance of MGC as a non-issue in ethico-legal terms, which was ultimately to 
determine Munby J’s position on the practice in B and G.  Prevailing norms concerning the sanctity of 
religious beliefs entail that a ruling which casts MGC as bodily harm appears to violate private and 
legitimate parental choices. The controversy occasioned by the Cologne ruling has continued,58 
particularly in the wake of a Council of Europe Resolution on ‘Children’s right to physical integrity’ in 
October 2013.59  This located male and female genital cutting within ‘a category of violations of the 
physical integrity of children which supporters of the procedures tend to present as beneficial to children 
themselves despite clear evidence to the contrary’,60 and expressed concern about modifying children’s 
bodies without their consent.  As Ammaturo notes, the Resolution for the first time legitimated calls ‘to 
establish a common framework for the evaluation of all invasive medical and surgical practices on 
children carried out without their informed consent’.61 Unsurprisingly, therefore, it too has generated 
counter measures.62 
 
LEGAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF BODILY INTEGRITY 
For our purposes, the debates on genital cutting suggest that one advantage of invoking bodily 
integrity discourse is that it renders visible the embodied harms that irreversible surgical and other  
interventions can cause.  In turn this has implications for how law responds, since, as Neff notes, courts 
have zealously promoted bodily integrity as ‘sacred, inviolable, inalienable and fundamental’.63 Bodily 
integrity doctrine explicitly grounds certain causes of action in tort and criminal law; for example, 
                                                
58 See, e.g. M. Frisch, ‘Circumcision Divide Between Denmark and Israel’ The Copenhagen Post (24 January 
2014).  
59 PACE Resolution 1952 (2013) - http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewPDF.asp?FileID=20174&lang=en (last visited 14 February 2017).  
60 id., s. 2. 
61 Ammaturo, op. cit., n.5, p. 592. 
62 A motion for a new resolution - ‘Freedom of religion and religious practices’ - aimed at counteracting the 
original was submitted on the 11th December 2013. Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Freedom of Religion and 
Religious Practices’ Council of Europe (11 December 2013). 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=20314&Language=EN (last visited 14 February 
2017). 
63 C.F. Neff, ‘Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity’ (1990-91) Yale J. L. & Feminism 327. 
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trespass to the person or battery.  In some jurisdictions, as we have seen, a constitutional basis for 
protecting bodily integrity exists.64 In most common law countries its legal foundation is less clear, 
although judicial dicta strongly vindicate some conception of bodily integrity, and as we noted above, 
Brazier has gone further, suggesting that bodily integrity is the ‘core legal value’ in health law.65 Other 
legal scholars have also asserted its foundational status. For instance, Robert Ludbrook contends that 
‘[t]he right to bodily integrity is the most personal and arguably the most important of all human 
rights,’66 while Nicollette Priaulx refers to ‘the fundamental importance of bodily integrity as a most 
basic psychological need’.67 Its role in safeguarding the physical parameters of the person renders it for 
Christine Neff ‘the cornerstone of all other liberties.’68 Similarly, Nussbaum positions it as a basic 
human capability central to being fully human. For her, bodily integrity protects sovereignty over one’s 
body and encompasses the ability to move freely, to have one’s bodily boundaries respected, and to be 
afforded opportunities for sexual satisfaction and reproductive choice.69  Judicial dicta also support the 
contention that bodily integrity is a core value, closely related to autonomy.70 For instance, in 1984 Goff 
LJ stated in Collins v Wilcock that human bodies were ‘inviolable’,71 echoing Cardozo J’s seminal 
statement in US law that every competent adult ‘has a right to determine what shall be done with his 
own body; and a surgeon who performs or operates without his patient’s consent commits an assault 
for which he is liable in damages.’72 Similar dicta can be traced in other UK rulings, many of which 
have attained a canonical status that helps perpetuate their uncritical acceptance.73 Explicit judicial 
references to ‘bodily integrity’ are less common, but again occur in high profile cases. Thus, in 
                                                
64 See M.T. Meulders-Klein, ‘The Right over One’s Body: Its Scope and Limits in Comparative Law’ (1983) 6 
B.C. International and Comparative L. R. 29. 
65  Brazier, op. cit., n.3. 
66 R. Ludbrook, ‘The Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity’ (1995-96) 7 Current Issues Crim Just. 123 at 132. 
67 N. Priaulx, ‘Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive Autonomy Matters’ (2008) 16 Medical Law 
Review 169 at 179. 
68 Neff, op. cit., n.61, p. 328. 
69 M. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000) 78. 
70 Pedwell, op. cit., n.4, p.132, n. 1. 
71 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172. 
72 Schoendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) per Cardozo J. More explicit references to bodily integrity 
underpinned Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v Casey 505 (U.S.) 833, 8499 (1992). The majority referred to 
the constitutional ‘limits on a state’s rights to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about family and 
parenthood as well as bodily integrity’, per O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ. 
73 E.g. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 per Lord Keith, 860, St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust v 
S. [1998] 3 All ER 673. 
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Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015], Lady Hale’s understanding of patient autonomy was 
explicitly linked to corporeality when she stated that:  
 
It is now well recognised that the interest which the law of negligence protects is a person’s 
interest in their own physical and psychiatric integrity… their freedom to decide what shall and 
shall not be done with their body.74 
 
Yet, despite this embeddedness in Anglo-American legal culture, it is rarely articulated, in 
judicial dicta or legal scholarship, why law should value or strive to protect bodily integrity, or the legal 
implications of so doing.  Consequently, we argue that judges operate with implicit and indeterminate 
understandings of the nature of human bodies that integrity discourse protects.  Occasionally these ideas 
are explicitly articulated and reveal some troubling implications of the conventional integrity model. A 
striking example is the appeal to bodily integrity in Re A,75 concerning the proposed surgical separation 
of conjoined twins who would both die if not separated. Surgery would offer the stronger twin (‘Jodie’) 
a reasonable chance of survival, but the weaker twin (‘Mary’) would inevitably die. Authorising the 
surgery, Ward LJ stated ‘the only gain I can see [for Mary] is that the operation would, if successful, 
give Mary the bodily integrity and dignity which is the natural order for all of us’,76 although he 
qualified this by recognising the ‘wholly illusory’ nature of this goal, since Mary would die. Brooke LJ 
went further in asserting that ‘[t]he doctrine of sanctity of life respects the integrity of the human body. 
The proposed operation would give these children’s bodies the integrity which nature denied them.’77 
In similar vein, Walker LJ determined that the operation would be in Mary’s best interests because ‘for 
the twins to remain alive and conjoined in the way they are would be to deprive them of the bodily 
integrity and human dignity which is the right of each of them.’78 On this conception, ‘the right to have 
                                                
74 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, per Lady Hale, para. 108.  
75 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. 
76 id., p. 184. 
77 id., p. 240. 
78 id., p. 258. 
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one's own body whole and intact’79 trumps other apparently fundamental values including sanctity of 
life, because, for Mary at least, it is attainable only in death.80 
 
As we see it, there are four key problems with such judicial dicta on bodily integrity, 
notwithstanding its potential to protect children.  First, it is apparent that bodily integrity is conceptualised 
largely in negative terms and deployed to shore up our bodily boundaries or to keep others off our 
bodies. As Elaine Scarry observes: 
 
The body, in this language, is conceived of as a palpable ground, the body has edges; it has 
specific boundaries - to cross over these boundaries without the authorisation of the person is 
an act of trespass.81 
 
Such conceptions of the body - as a sacred territory to be defended against the encroachment of others 
-  have been traced by Ngaire Naffine to the ‘Kantian idea of a managed, distinct, intact body which is 
not debasing us and is not getting in the way of the proper dispassionate exercise of reason’.82  Savell 
has highlighted how similar notions underpin Blackstone’s influential notion of the ‘sacred’ and 
inviolable human body.83 On these understandings, premised on the sovereignty and boundedness of 
bodies and their separation from the mind, violation of bodily integrity offends against the individual 
bodily wholeness that is necessary for human flourishing.84 
 
                                                
79 id., p. 259. 
80 I. Karpin and R. Mykitiuk, ‘Feminist legal theory as embodied justice’ in Fineman, op. cit., n.22, p. 115, 
p.124. In other contexts, such as tissue donation, this tension between bodily integrity and life plays out 
differently – see B. Lyons, ‘Obliging Children’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 55. 
81 Scarry’s focus is Cardozo’s dicta op., cit., n.72 – E. Scarry, ‘Consent and the Body: Injury, Departure and 
Desire’ (1990) New Literary History 867, 868  
82 N. Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (2009) 148. 
83 K. Savell, ‘Sex and the Sacred: Sterilization and Bodily Integrity in English and Canadian Law’ (2003-4) 49 
McGill LJ 1093. 
84 IW. Dekkers, C. Hoffer, J.P. Wils, ‘Bodily integrity and male and female circumcision’ (2005) 8 Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 179 at 186; G.P. McKenny, ‘The Integrity of the Body: Critical remarks on a 
Persistent Theme in Bioethics’ in Persons and Their Bodies: Rights, Responsibilities, Relationships M.J. Cherry 
ed. (1999) 353. 
 17 
Secondly, and relatedly, we suggest that conventional conceptions are rooted in a problematic 
boundary metaphor which leaves them ill-equipped to accommodate certain forms of embodiment. 
Dekker et al have highlighted how, in addition to valuing anatomical wholeness, Kantian views of 
integrity encompass an important dimension of functional integrity which underpins biological 
intactness.85  While intriguing notions of authorisation, control, function and flourishing ground these 
conventional narratives of bodily integrity, Jennifer Nedelsky highlights how the boundary metaphors 
that accompany them can be pervasive and destructive, arguing that ‘in law the concept of boundary 
has become more of a mask than a lens’.86 This resonates with Savell’s argument that the boundary-
dependent accounts of conventional bodily integrity, and the judicial dicta which they continue to 
influence, fail to capture the embodied complexity of what is at stake in such cases.87 As we explain 
below, this requires human bodies to be understood as inherently relational, experiential and subject to 
change by interactions with society.88  By contrast, it is striking that existing legal accounts resonate 
with under-theorised conceptions of self-ownership which implicitly view the body as spatial property 
that needs to be defended from others.89  Of course, property is a complex notion which can be 
conceptualised in progressive ways. Thus, commentators have argued that granting property rights over 
one’s bodies and bodily parts and products can enhance one’s ability to make autonomous choices and 
control what happens to one’s body.90 This view has been especially influential in recent health law 
scholarship, particularly in the context of our growing ability to fragment and commodify bodies.91  Yet 
we are not persuaded by the idea that all legal subjects may be regarded as owning their bodies in the 
somewhat simplistic manner that judges and theorists ranging from Blackstone to Nussbaum have 
                                                
85 id., p. 184; D. Leder, ‘Whose Body? What Body? The Metaphysics of Organ Transplantation’ in Cherry, id. 
233. 
86 J. Nedelsky, Law’s Relations (2011) 107.  
87 Savell, op. cit. n.83; similarly, Nedelsky observes that legal language is ‘extremely poor at capturing… 
interconnection’, id., p. 11; J. Nedelsky ‘Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self’ (1990) 30 Representations 
162. 
88 Our approach has much in common with Nedelsky’s account of ‘law’s relations’ in which she develops a 
vision of the ‘self’ as particular, embodied and affective.  See, Nedelsky, op. cit., 86, chapter 4. 
89 See pp. xx above 
90 See e.g. R.P. Petchesky, ‘The Body as Property: a feminist re-vision’ in F.D. Ginsberg, and R. Rapp, (eds) 
Conceiving the New World Order (1995); D. Dickenson, Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives (2007). 
91 See e.g., J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, ‘Consent or Property: Dealing with the Body and its Parts in the 
Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey’ (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 710; R. Hardcastle, Law and the Human 
Body: Property Rights, Ownership and Control (2007). 
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assumed. For us, such views fail to capture the complexities of embodiment.  As Alan Hyde has argued, 
many of us inhabit less inviolable bodies and law facilitates social use or invasion of our bodies “by 
constructing various discursive bodies, sometimes defined as interests in liberty or property, sometimes 
as things or property, sometimes through euphemistic language which makes the body disappear.”92  
Law thereby enables ‘certain modes of bodily being’ while simultaneously it ‘denigrates or forecloses 
others.’93  It follows, for instance, that aberrational bodies which challenge legal boundaries between 
persons or categories (such as conjoined twins or intersex persons) must be surgically normalised.  In 
this vein Bogdonoski shows how the bodily choices permitted by law tend to be those that promote 
‘socio-culturally acceptable forms of embodiment’.  Thus, conventional cosmetic surgery or MGC is 
legally tolerated, whereas forms of surgery which give rise to socially transgressive embodiment are 
rendered illegitimate.94  Furthermore, law’s reification of a distinct, individuated body leaves it - and 
the conventional integrity model - ill-equipped to cope, not only with ‘anomalous’ bodies, but also 
common forms of conjoined embodiment, notably the pregnant body.95  As Isabel Karpin notes of 
pregnancy, ‘the woman’s body is seen as neither container nor separate entity from the foetus. Until the 
baby is born the fetus is the female body. It is part of her body/self.’96 Yet, as conventionally articulated 
in Anglo-American legal discourse, bodily integrity discourse is unable to accommodate such 
complexity and its gendered implications, to the point that Drucilla Cornell has contended that notions 
of self-ownership are illusory in the pregnancy context.97 More broadly, still, it is questionable how 
many of us actually inhabit or possess intact bodies, given bodily susceptibility to disease, illness and 
aging processes; and certainly it is difficult to measure intactness or completeness, especially since this 
is culturally determined.98 Consequently, we would argue that property discourse and its accompanying 
                                                
92 A. Hyde, Bodies of Law (1995) 259. 
93 N. Sullivan and S. Stryker, ‘King’s Member, Queen’s Body’: Transsexual Surgery, Self-Demand Amputation 
and the Somatechnics of Sovereign Power’ in Somatechnics: Queering the Technologisation of Bodies, N. 
Sullivan and S. Murray eds (2009) 49 at 50-51. 
94 T. Bogdonoski, ‘Every Body Is Different: Regulating the Use (and non-Use of Cosmetic Surgery, Body 
Modification and Reproductive Genetic Testing’ (2009) 18 Griffiths Law Review 503. 
95 V. Munro, ‘Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Dilemma of Conjoined Twins and Individual Rights’ (2001) 10 
Social and Legal Studies 459.  
96  I. Karpin, ‘Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman’ (1992) 3 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 325. 
97 D. Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment (1995), ch 2. 
98 Bogdanoski, op. cit., n.94, p. 524; Karpin and Mykitiuk, op. cit., n.80, p. 118. 
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metaphors of space, territory and ownership are not productive in examining how law regulates bodily 
interventions.  This is particularly true of interventions on children’s bodies, where constructing the 
body in property terms carries additional risks. As we saw above, the tolerance of parental choice in the 
MGC cases supported O’Donovan’s argument that the denial of legal subjectivity to children results in 
their construction as legal objects, over whom parents exercise power and control.99 Conceiving of all 
human bodies as property in line with conventional bodily integrity approaches serves only to facilitate 
such parental control over their children. 
Thirdly, given how the conventional model is limited to protecting physical corporeal 
boundaries, we are troubled by its propensity to justify intrusive and paternalistic state regulation in 
opening up all bodies to increased surveillance. This process is traced by Miller in her analysis of laws 
regulating reproduction and sexual intercourse. She outlines a shift occurring in the twentieth-century 
from legal models rooted in consent to those based on bodily integrity. Whereas consent is ‘a specific, 
narrowly defined legal’ concept that can be exercised only by ‘mature, sane politically active 
individuals’,100 Miller suggests that bodily integrity rights can be more widely invoked.  Yet she 
cautions that, while typically read as a narrative of progress,101 this history contains a regressive 
undercurrent, since in conceptualising women’s bodies as space bodily integrity approaches have 
rendered women ‘subject to more extensive searches and to further regulation’.102 In the case of 
children, comparable or greater dangers of overzealous state intrusion exist, especially since, as we have 
suggested, the rhetoric of self-ownership arguably encompasses the problematic idea of parental 
ownership of the bodies of their children. 
 
Finally, we are concerned that, as is apparent in the Cologne ruling and ‘FGM’ debates, once 
certain forms of embodiment or bodily interventions are cast as illegitimate in the ways that Bogdonoski 
                                                
99 See  O’Donovan, op. cit., n.19. 
100 Miller, op. cit., n.23, p. 7. 
101 This narrative of progress can be traced in global liberalisation of abortion law - R.J. Cook, et al (eds) 
Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective (2014); R. Rebouche, ‘Abortion Rights as Human Rights’ (2016) 25 
Social and Legal Studies 76. Yet, in line with Miller’s note of caution, it is important to note the continuing 
regressive impact of criminalisation – S. Sheldon, ‘British Abortion Law: Speaking from the Past to Govern the 
Future’ (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 283. 
102 Miller, op. cit., n.23, p. 15. 
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outlines, this mandates a punitive State response.  Although we believe that UK law currently offers 
inadequate protection to the interests of the child,103 we would demur at casting these parental choices 
as criminal. First, we would argue that prosecutions often reveal how parents and doctors have acted 
with good motivations. Moreover, as we have seen, the gendered104 and racialised105 dimensions of 
conventional bodily integrity and its tendency to be mobilised in normative and judgmental ways, has 
impacted on prosecutorial decision-making.106 Criminalising such actions simply increases the 
likelihood that high profile  prosecutions will fail or that juries will be reluctant to convict, and will 
likely generate a backlash against progressive legal initiatives, as witnessed in the wake of the European 
Parliament resolution.  
 
FROM BODIES TO EMBODIMENT; FROM BODILY INTEGRITY TO EMBODIED INTEGRITY 
 
It is worth stressing that, notwithstanding our critique of conventional bodily integrity doctrine, 
we recognise its important role in problematising non-consensual shaping of children’s bodies.   As 
Savell has argued, the continuing appeal of conventional integrity arguments lies in the enhanced 
protection they afford against unwarranted intrusion: 
 
The ‘invasion’ narrative prevents doctors from interfering with bodies without consent, in 
anything other than exceptional circumstances. This narrative engages the concepts of ‘dignity’, 
‘inviolability of the person’ and ‘bodily integrity’ and deploys metaphors of invasion to 
problematize the imposition of [for instance] sterilisation without consent.107 
 
                                                
103 Fox and Thomson, op.cit., n. 15. 
104 Savell, op. cit., n.83. 
105 Sullivan, op. cit., n.11.  
106  The race/ethnicity of health professionals who have been prosecuted is striking, see n.14, n.30 and n.34. 
107 Savell, op. cit., n.83, p. 1124. 
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Nedelsky too has highlighted the power of such narratives in contesting interference,108 and we agree 
that their value lies in countering parental power and limiting irreversible interventions on children’s 
bodies, as was evident in the Cologne case.  Consequently we reject the views of some commentators 
that conventional bodily integrity doctrine should be jettisoned.109  Rather, we concur with Cornell that 
it is precisely because our corporeality is susceptible to change and development, and dependent on 
others for its realisation, that bodily integrity doctrine is so valuable in protecting it.  However, 
conventional approaches need to be supplemented by a more complex and nuanced vision of bodily 
integrity that incorporates what Emily Grabham has referred to as ‘more socialised understandings’: 
 
A propertied or sovereigntist understanding of embodiment as the subject’s ownership and 
determination of the soma is often usefully surpassed, or augmented, by other theoretical 
imaginings of embodied selfhood, such as ideas of bio-social entanglements between cultural, 
social and technical processes.110 
 
These nuanced and relational ‘theoretical imaginings’ not only complicate conventional legal accounts, 
but are consistent with a theoretical shift in contemporary health law from the body to embodiment as 
a focus of concern.111  Embodiment scholarship has been attentive to the importance of integrating 
physical and mental dimensions of bodies and health,112 in order to avoid replicating the mind/body 
split which, as we have seen, contributes to problematic readings of the legal subject113 and continues 
to structure dominant legal understandings of bodily integrity. As Simon Williams and Gillian 
Bendelow argue, embodiment theory rejects the tendency ‘to theorise about bodies in a largely 
                                                
108 J. Nedelsky. ‘Property in Potential Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories’ (1993) 6 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 343; and Law’s Relations op. cit., n. 86, ch 2. 
109 C. Fabre, Whose Body is it Anyway? Justice and the Integrity of the Person (2008). 
110 E. Grabham, ‘Bodily integrity and the Surgical Management of Intersex’ (2012) 18 Body & Society 1, 3. 
111 M. Fox and T. Murphy, ‘The Body, Bodies, Embodiment: Feminist Legal Engagement with Health’ in A 
Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory, M. Davies, and V. Munro, eds. (2013); N. Naffine, ‘The Legal 
Structure of Self Ownership: Or the Self-Possessed Man and the Woman Possessed’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law 
and Society 193. 
112 R. Cain, ‘“A View You Won’t Get Anywhere Else”? Depressed Mothers, Public Regulation and ‘Private’ 
Narrative’ (2007) 17 Feminist Legal Studies 123. 
113 T. Murphy, ‘Feminism on Flesh’ (1997) 8 Law & Critique 37. 
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disembodied… way’ and instead validates ‘a new mode of social theorising from lived bodies’.114 This 
approach recognises that bodies are not simply instrumentally valuable, but rather are ‘a constitutive 
part of who we are’,115 and who we may become. It accommodates more fluid visions of bodily integrity 
which, far from being static, accommodate the mutability and plasticity of bodies. Such conceptions 
encompass not only decisions to modify our bodies but highlight the importance of transcending our 
bodies. As Priaulx observes: 
 
Being able to take one’s body more or less for granted (quite irrespective of what one’s existing 
physical state actually is), rather than being conscious of and consumed by one’s physicality 
all the time, is what is best captured by bodily integrity. It is a sense of self, a stable platform 
for pursuing one’s plans, rather than an actual descriptor of our physicality.116 
 
By requiring merely that others leave our physical selves alone, conventional accounts of bodily 
integrity fail to capture this constitutive element of embodied approaches. Nor do they recognise how 
our bodies are mediated in numerous mundane ways by their dependency on the social environment in 
which they operate or their relationship with others.117 Occasionally case law on therapeutic 
intervention has been attentive to the dependent relationships in which children are enmeshed, and has 
hinted at a more progressive approach to conceptualising integrity.  For instance, in Glass v UK the 
mother of David Glass - a severely disabled 12 year old boy - withheld her consent to the administration 
of diamorphine which hospital staff, who believed David to be dying, wished to administer to alleviate 
his distress.118  His mother contended that such medical intervention interfered with David’s rights 
under Article 8 of the ECHR to ‘respect for his personal integrity’. While accepting that David Glass 
had such a right, the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) paid scant attention to its content or 
                                                
114 S.J. Williams and G. Bendelow, The Lived Body: Sociological Themes, Embodied Issues (1998). In this 
regard, embodied approaches draw on phenomenology - see V. Sobchack, ‘Living a ‘Phantom Limb’: on the 
Phenomenology of Bodily Integrity’ (2010) 16 Body & Society 51. 
115 E.F. Kittay, ‘Forever Small: The Strange Case of Ashley X’ (2011) 26 Hypatia 610 at 617. 
116 Priaulx, op. cit. n 67, p. 187. 
117 G. Ramachandran, ‘Against the Right to Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human Rights’ (2009) 87 Denver 
University Law Review 1 at 10. 
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contours, simply concluding that the NHS Trust concerned should have referred the issue of whether 
his treatment was legitimate and necessary for judicial determination. It thus found it unnecessary ‘to 
pronounce on the applicant’s contention that the authorities had failed to comply with the positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for [David Glass’s] right to personal integrity by failing to 
adopt the measures designed to secure respect for his personal integrity.’119 
 
Nevertheless the EctHR’s acceptance that the Article 8 rights of David Glass encompass not 
only his physical integrity, (which had been recognised in earlier rulings on Article 8120) but also his 
personal  integrity, is significant. Given its failure to clarify what ‘personal integrity’ entailed, it would 
be contentious to read the EctHR’s recognition of ‘personal integrity’ as synonymous with ‘bodily 
integrity’. However, we agree with Mary Donnelly and Ursula Kilkelly that the ruling acknowledged 
‘a right to physical and psychological integrity which is not dependent on the subject’s decision-making 
capacity’.121  The following year this was underlined in Storck v Germany, when the Court ruled that 
states are under an obligation ‘to secure to its citizens their right to physical and moral integrity’, so 
that forced psychiatric treatment of a vulnerable patient could amount to a breach of Article 8.122  
Importantly for our purposes, Donnelly and Kilkelly interpret Glass as carving out for the child a 
distinct status as a rights-holding subject.  In this sense the ruling seems to us to fit with Ammaturo’s 
call in her work on normalising intersex surgeries for a shift from medicalisation to juridification. She 
argues that such a shift requires that the child’s agency be recognised so that she: 
 
becomes the focus of attention, rather than the ultimate target of action, together with a 
consideration of all the corollary aspects relating to the… infant’s cultural, social and religious 
background that play a role in influencing parents’ decisions.123 
 
                                                
119 id., para 74. 
120 E.g., X&Y v The Netherlands 8978/80 8 EHRR 235 (1985); Bensaid v UK 44599/98 [2001] ECHR 82. 
121 M. Donnelly, and U. Kilkelly, ‘Child Friendly Health Care: Delivering on the Right to be Heard’ (2011) 19 
Medical Law Review 27 at 49. 
122 Storck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96. 
123 Ammaturo, op. cit., n.5, p. 603. 
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  Dicta in cases like Glass and Storck thus points to a shift from a static and spatial understanding 
of the right to private and family life towards one that is more dynamic and relational, able to encompass 
context and circumstances. Read in this way Glass also supports our view that bodily integrity has a 
particular value for children and that a meaningful conception of the principle must encompass a 
psychological dimension, rather than simply policing bodily boundaries as envisaged by the 
conventional integrity model. By acknowledging both physical and psychic dimensions of integrity in 
order to ground an emerging legal subjectivity Glass hints at a move towards the embodied conception 
of integrity that we advocate. It also demonstrates how such a model can accord fuller protection to a 
child’s interests than they have received under conventional applications of the best interests standard. 
As we highlight below, similar reasoning occurs in some UK cases dealing more directly with surgical 
modification of children. First, however, we examine the implications of situating body modification 
choices for children within this embodied integrity framework. 
 
REFRAMING BODILY INTEGRITY DOCTRINE 
1.Cornell and bodily integrity: protecting emerging subjectivity 
We have suggested that the value of traditional bodily integrity doctrine lies in its protection of 
bodily boundaries but that this alone is not enough.  We argue that the concept should be reframed in a 
way that reflects the theoretical shift from physical bodies to embodiment outlined above, and that is 
grounded in the lived experience of embodied beings.  This would understand bodies both as a 
constitutive part of human identity and as existing at the intersection of the material, the institutional 
and the symbolic.124 In contrast to the mind/body split that continues to underpin conventional integrity, 
embodied integrity views the body as an intrinsic part of our ontology, of who we are. It thus acts as an 
indispensable platform for the realisation of future projects.  Positioning embodied integrity as a core 
legal value would, in our view, facilitate new approaches to standard bioethical questions raised by 
bodily modification, and enable interrogation of how embodied choices are variously cast as socio-
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culturally legitimate or illegitimate.125 As we have outlined above, UK law displays radically 
differential approaches to different forms of genital cutting. Below we contend that interrogating the 
disparity in attitudes to these practices should prompt a change that would entail placing a special value 
on embodied integrity as a starting point for biomedical decision-making. In this regard we find 
Cornell’s analysis of bodily integrity instructive since, for her, the doctrine is valuable precisely because 
our corporeality is susceptible to change – a bodily plasticity typically not acknowledged in judicial 
reasoning which continues to view bodies as fixed.126  In contrast Cornell conceives of all persons as 
unfinished entities in a constant state of flux or becoming. Consequently, bodily integrity must be 
understood as a process that is never completed, but which must nevertheless be absolutely protected 
as a pre-requisite for equality.127  Such protection carves out a space for individuals to transform 
themselves into persons able to ‘participate in public and political life as equal citizens’,128 and to 
become fully individuated persons.  Cornell’s approach is clearly explicated in the abortion context, 
where she argues that unless access to safe legal abortions is guaranteed, women are effectively reduced 
to their maternal functions and denied the conditions of individuation or self-determination that men 
enjoy.129 She states: ‘To separate the woman from her womb or to reduce her to it is to deny her the 
conditions of selfhood that depend on the ability to project bodily integrity.’130 The centrality of law in 
securing abortion access highlights how Cornell conceives of bodily integrity as a process which is 
dependent on our relations with others, and which can be facilitated by law. As Mervi Patosalmi notes: 
 
Although the person is a process, there is a demand to be treated as a whole, integrated, and 
rational unity despite the fact that that is not a condition that accords with reality. Because the 
personality is a process that is dependent on others, the state and the legal system should also 
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be understood as confirming or denying the person’s wholeness, and that those entities are also 
involved in the construction of the personality.131 
 
Cornell thus demonstrates how bodily integrity can be re-thought in ways that address the 
limitations of conventional integrity and does so in a manner compatible with our vision of an embodied 
health law.  Although her focus is on women, we see her vision of bodily integrity as especially 
illuminating when applied to children, given the physical, hormonal and emotional changes they 
undergo, which entails that they exist in an even greater state of flux. An embodied integrity model 
would go beyond respecting the physical boundaries of children protected by conventional conceptions, 
to encompass corporeal change and development and acknowledge the importance of psychological 
integrity. It would also recognise the child as relational, rather than existing in isolation from her family.  
In this regard, Jo Bridgeman contends that Glass ultimately disappoints, despite the protection it offers 
the child from non-consensual interference.  She reads the ECtHR’s judgment as overly concerned to 
shore up the individual bodily boundaries of the child, arguing that it fails to flesh out a more relational 
approach to integrity which would “reflect the complex reality of the inevitable dependency involved: 
the dependency of a child with severe disabilities upon his or her parents, parental dependency upon 
health care professionals and the dependency of the state upon the care provided by parents to their 
child”.132 Bridgeman advocates recognising the child as both separate from, but situated within, these 
complex webs of care, attachment and interdependency.  She demonstrates the tightrope that the courts 
tread in such cases in seeking to recognise the child as relational while simultaneously not allowing her 
interests to be submerged, as happened in cases prior to Glass.133  Although not fully realised, however, 
the judicial attempt in Glass to prioritise personal integrity as something belonging to the child alone is 
helpful in stressing the need to separate out the child’s interests and the importance of protecting her 
from non-consensual interventions.  Indeed, awareness of the risks of situating the child within a 
network of others on whom she is dependent may partly explain why the judges in Glass hesitated to 
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fully endorse the relational approach advocated by Bridgeman. The case of MGC clearly shows how 
over-emphasising family integrity has led to cultural acceptance of cutting boys.  Because of this we 
dispute Herring and Foster’s contention that best interests is ultimately reducible to ‘maintaining the 
child's place in his network of relationships’.134 Rather, the value of embodied integrity lies precisely 
in how it underpins the child’s emergent subjectivity, meaning that her needs are never synonymous 
with those of others. 
 
As such, our embodied integrity model supplements the conventional conception by extending 
it beyond the material body and acknowledging the plasticity of bodies and those who inhabit them. 
Within this model, retaining the negative injunction to keep off children’s bodies - as captured by the 
invasion narrative - is an essential counterbalance to actions that we would characterise as parental 
over-reach.  As Neff has argued, prioritising bodily integrity ‘provide[s] comprehensive protection 
against unwanted physical intrusion’.135  Indeed, the importance of respecting bodily boundaries in 
order to support the child’s ability to decide provides a necessary caveat to the sometimes uncritical 
endorsement of relational theory in child and health law.136 Whilst commentators such as Gilmore and 
Herring argue that relational theory may (at times) allow parents to over-ride decisions by their children 
when such decisions might lead to ‘irreparable harm or death’,137 this view remains contentious.138 
Further, we would challenge a relational justification for a parent choosing a non-therapeutic 
intervention which might cause bodily harm or even death, as in the case of genitally cutting either sex.  
Instead, our embodied integrity model would shift the onus to those who propose medically 
unnecessary, irreversible and non-consensual modifications to children’s bodies to justify their actions.  
While Herring and Foster have asserted that ‘a philosophically explicit protocol would quickly become 
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tyrannous’,139 in our view placing embodied integrity at the heart of best interests decision-making 
counters criticisms of this standard that we address below, and accords with theoretical accounts of the 
importance of integrity for self-determination and self-realisation in later life. 
 
2. The Role of Embodied Integrity in Protecting Future Interests 
Taking bodily integrity as a starting point once non-therapeutic shaping of children is proposed 
would alter the current operation of the best interests standard by weighing more appropriately the 
respective obligations of parents, health professionals and the state,140 and countering the excessive 
parental power we have noted. Importantly, and as our discussion of genital cutting illustrates, it would 
highlight the diverse forms of harm that can result from irreversible surgery.141  It also counters many 
criticisms that have been levelled at the best interests test. Commentators have charged that the standard 
is contentless,142 its terminology is wholly unclear,143 it offers no meaningful guide to judges,144 operates 
to advance parental and professional interests,145 obscures the prejudices, values, and common-sense 
notions of the judiciary,146 and masks systemic or societal prejudices.147 Finally, it has been suggested 
that best interests assessments mean that the child’s own views are often ignored in matters that affect 
her present and future wishes.148 Certainly in recent years both legislation and court rulings149 have 
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engaged more fully with what best interests means. S.1(3) of the Children Act offers a list of factors 
which courts should take into account in determining the best interests of the child, including the risk 
of any harm, the emotional and educational as well as physical needs of the child and any of the child’s 
characteristics which the court considers relevant.150 Nevertheless, recent case law continues to bear out 
Rob Heywood’s observation that, “in practice the majority of parental views about medical treatment 
are actually respected and only on rare occasions are they challenged and overturned’,151 and Helen 
Stalford’s contention that ‘in reality best interests assessments are unnervingly instinctive and highly 
contingent on the subjective assessment and value framework of the decision-maker’.152 
 
For all its problems however, as Elliston notes, it is hard to think of a viable alternative, so 
entrenched has this standard become.153 Rather than jettisoning best interests, therefore, we argue that 
explicitly taking bodily integrity into account as part of the best interests decision-making process and 
casting it as a factor which trumps other values would serve both to give content to the standard and to 
ensure that children’s interests are better protected. Prioritising embodied integrity within these 
assessments alters significantly the very contested calculations of risks and benefits that best interests 
judgments seem to mandate.154 A prominent philosophical justification for curbing parental power is 
Joel Feinberg’s thesis that children possess a right to an open future.  Feinberg divides children’s rights 
into two sub-classes: dependency rights (which derive from the child’s dependence on others) and 
rights-in-trust (which the child is not yet capable of exercising, but which must be protected so that they 
can be exercised by the future adult).155  Conduct violates a right-in-trust when it ‘guarantees now that 
when the child is an autonomous adult, certain key options will already be closed’ to that individual.156  
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The content of these rights vary, but they are essentially rights ‘given to the child in the person of the 
adult she will become’.157 They are characterised as ‘anticipatory autonomy rights’, which require that 
‘basic options are kept open and growth kept ‘natural’ or unforced”.158  Any ‘serious and final 
commitments’159 must be postponed until the child is mature and legally capable of making the decision 
herself.  Consequently she should be ‘permitted to reach maturity with as many open options, 
opportunities and advantages as possible’.160 This duty to maximise options and opportunities clearly 
limits parental decision-making, particularly regarding health care, education and bodily interventions. 
 
The open future principle has attracted criticism, with some suggesting that it is too concerned 
with the future individual at the expense of the child who is the subject of any decision.161 However 
Alicia Ouellette disputes this, contending that the right to an open future is grounded in rights to bodily 
integrity and self-determination.162 The principle therefore values and protects the child subject by 
respecting her bodily integrity from childhood. Ouellette argues that its application also respects core 
parental rights and obligations since it would not interfere with medical decisions arising from a 
physical or psychological need.  However: 
 
[d]ecisions to use medicine or surgery to shape a child based on a parent’s social, cultural, or 
aesthetic preferences – especially those that limit the child’s ability to make significant choices 
central to his or her identity – would be treated differently.163 
 
While Ouellette does not explicitly engage with genital cutting, Robert Darby contends that 
circumcising male children violates the open future principle,164 and therefore should be deferred until 
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the child can choose for himself.  In English law, we suggest that  the seeds of such an approach can be 
traced in the High Court judgment in Re S; although unlike Glass it is not couched in the language of 
integrity. However, as in Glass, Baron J’s reasoning, endorsed by the Court of Appeal, disentangles the 
interests of parents and children, rather than assuming that they are synonymous: 
 
Circumcision once done cannot be undone. It may have an effect on K if he wishes to practice 
Jainism when he grows up. He has been ambivalent about his religion and is not old enough to 
decide or understand the long-term implications. It is not in his best interests to be circumcised 
at present…. By the date of puberty K would be Gillick competent and so he could make an 
informed decision.165 
 
Her recognition that the decision properly belongs to the boy himself when he reaches the stage of 
Gillick-competence robustly defends the values of autonomy and bodily integrity, which mandates 
deferring decisions until a child is sufficiently mature to decide. This was also evident more recently in 
Re L and B (children) (Specific Issues: Temporary Leave to Remove from the Jurisdiction; 
Circumcision).166 Again, the case involved a dispute between separated parents, in this instance 
regarding the care and upbringing of two boys aged 6 and 4. It concerned, inter alia, an application by 
the father to have the two boys circumcised in accordance with their Muslim faith. The mother objected 
and argued that this should be left for the boys to decide when they were competent to make the 
decisions. Roberts J declined to make the order, claiming that she was ‘simply deferring that decision 
to the point where each of the boys themselves will make their individual choices once they have 
maturity and insight to appreciate the consequences and longer term effects of the decisions which they 
reach’.167 Such rulings also reflect an emerging consensus amongst health law commentators. As 
Elliston argues: 
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Male circumcision is a matter where serious consideration should be given to postponing 
decisions until children are of an age to be able to consider them for themselves, and I would 
say the same for other forms of elective surgery.168  
 
While  Baron J, Roberts J, and Elliston do not couch their stance in the language of bodily integrity, we 
read them as implicitly endorsing its role in guaranteeing the agency and subjectivity of the younger 
child in a manner similar to the invocation of integrity in Glass.  Grounding such reasoning more 
explicitly in the vision of embodied integrity we have defended would enhance the logic of deferring 
embodied choices until they can be made by the person who will live with them.  A similar approach 
underpinned the early, and widely applauded, sterilisation case of Re D, where Heilbron J concurred 
with a doctor’s opinion ‘that it was wrong to perform this operation on an 11 year old, on the pretext 
that it would benefit her in the future’.169  Heilbron’s judgment also respects the emerging right of the 
child to make embodied choices for herself and recognises her emerging legal subjectivity.  As with 
Glass, this reasoning positions the integrity or autonomy of the child as ethically prior to the integrity 
or autonomy of the family and aligns with the core proposition of the open future principle that ‘parental 
practices which close exits virtually forever are insufficiently attentive to the child as an end in 
herself’.170 
 
Cornell’s conceptualisation of bodily integrity adds a further dimension to the open future 
principle in stipulating that the conditions for personhood must be legally guaranteed in order for one 
to be able to imagine oneself as whole.  This remains true even if such wholeness will never truly be 
attained.171 For adults, such considerations are central to other contested health care interventions 
including gender reassignment surgery172 and elective amputation,173 which depend on the subject’s 
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ability to project their own vision of bodily integrity.  In the case of children we see bodily integrity as 
similarly important in protecting their future capacity to shape their own bodies – a capacity which lies 
at the heart of cases such as Re D, Re S and Re L and B.  By revealing corporeal harms, and thereby 
helping to contest intrusive interventions on the bodies of children, approaches grounded in embodied 
integrity afford legal protection to children by casting them as moral agents who are not reducible to 
vehicles for parental desires. Hence, just as Cornell contends that her vision of bodily integrity 
‘demands that women’s bodies are respected, treated as if they have equivalent worth and cannot be 
violated’,174 we argue that the concept demands this for children. To make decisions for them about the 
corporeal form they inhabit violates the principle of embodied integrity by denying the process of 
integration which allows them to become individuated beings. In this way our analysis helps deepen a 
child’s right to an open future.  It emphasises the significance of embodied integrity in the processes of 
self-determination that enable the individuated self, and contrasts sharply with the static, propertied, 
and bounded notion often envisioned in legal discussions of conventional integrity. 
 
In considering the legal protection that should result, Mianna Lotz has argued that the child’s 
right to an open future encompasses both negative and positive rights. As she notes, and as we have 
argued of conventional integrity, the right is ‘often collapsed into the negative injunction to refrain from 
violating conduct’.175 Yet, the duty to ‘keep a child’s future open’ can also be understood as a positive 
claim right.176 Lotz argues that positive obligations encompass both agent-internal and agent-external 
autonomy conditions. Agent-internal conditions include ‘the skills and capacities for information 
seeking, critical reflection, deliberative independence’ and so forth,177 and relate to the individual’s 
context.  As regards agent-external conditions, she argues: 
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There are no doubt additional agent-external conditions, aside from those pertaining directly to 
the quantity and quality of a child’s options, which parents – though importantly, not parents 
alone – may have positive duties in regard to. These might plausibly include duties to seek to 
protect children, as far as possible, from coercion, manipulation, enslavement, unjust 
imprisonment, and oppression.178 
 
Although protection of bodily integrity seems implicit in Lotz’s list, we would make explicit the 
obligation to promote it and so enable children to become individuated persons. This obligation, 
moreover, imposes duties on the state as well as on parents and health professionals. As Nussbaum 
reasons, ‘the public conception must design the material and institutional environment so that it 
provides the requisite affirmative support for all relevant capabilities’, including bodily or embodied 
integrity.179 We have argued that prioritising embodied integrity in best interests assessments is a key 
step in this regard. However, in line with Cornell, this should be directed not only at protecting 
boundaries but also at securing the conditions which allow us to imagine things differently.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
In seeking to contest the excessive power that law has accorded parents to make irreversible 
non-therapeutic interventions on their children’s bodies, this article has addressed Brazier’s contention 
that bodily integrity now constitutes the ‘core legal value’ in health law.180  We have argued that debates 
over a particular form of embodied practice – the non-consensual genital cutting of children’s bodies – 
reveal both the appeal of and the indeterminacy inherent in the concept of bodily integrity.  In part this 
indeterminacy is attributable to variations in how the concept is understood, articulated and deployed 
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in health and human rights law. Claims to bodily integrity are variously framed as a matter of personal 
or physical integrity, and slippages exist between these different terms and how they are used across 
time. Nevertheless, what is common to all conceptions of bodily integrity is their powerful rhetorical 
appeal in contesting non-therapeutic interventions on the bodies of children.  They direct attention to 
bodily risks and harms which are typically obscured under conventional assessments of what is in the 
best interests of a child. In so doing, such discourse poses vital questions about the desirability and 
legitimacy, or otherwise, of particular bodily interventions. Yet, as conventionally articulated, we have 
argued that bodily integrity remains partial, gendered and under-theorised in law. Consequently, across 
the practices and jurisdictions we have examined, law displays an uneven commitment to protecting 
bodily integrity. Further, we have relied on its invocation in the genital cutting context to show that this 
discourse has been deployed in problematic and potentially counter-productive ways.  On the one hand 
it is questionable what the criminalisation of FGC and calls for more intensive policing and prosecution 
have achieved, while on the other we see it as problematic that the practice of MGC continues to be 
largely ignored by law, notwithstanding notable exceptions such as the Cologne case. This partiality 
and resultant impact on law and policy lead us to doubt the suitability of bodily integrity as 
conventionally understood as a core legal value. 
 
For the potential of bodily integrity discourse to be fully realised we argue that it should be 
conceptualised in a more complex and nuanced way than dominant notions rooted in spatial conceptions 
of property, boundaries and self/parental ownership of the body.  Such narratives fail to capture what 
is at stake in making embodied choices, either for ourselves or others, and allows law to discriminate 
against certain bodies and embodied practices, while valorising others. Therefore, while acknowledging 
the rhetorical force and protective power of what Savell has deemed the ‘invasion narrative’, we argue 
that Cornell’s articulation of bodily integrity can contribute to reframing a thicker form of embodied 
integrity with stronger claims to be regarded as a core legal value. Her vision of bodily integrity more 
successfully captures the complexity of the doctrine and avoids valorising particular normative 
conceptions of bodies, while also stressing the provisional and contingent nature of our bodily integrity 
and the plasticity of human embodiment. We suggest that Cornell’s approach is particularly valuable in 
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the case of children, as it acknowledges the child’s agency (or future agency) and enriches our 
understanding of the child’s right to an open future.  In so doing, it highlights the importance of 
respecting the child’s legal subjectivity – imposing obligations upon individual parents, health 
professionals, and the state. Importantly, this argument is also in line with emerging jurisprudential 
trends in both UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights, and the trend towards an embodied 
health law. 
 
Casting embodied integrity as central to decision-making on behalf of children also has 
practical value in serving to problematise and contest various surgeries and interventions currently 
countenanced by law.  In the genital cutting context we suggest that law should accord greater weight 
to the value of embodied integrity in making best interests decisions, building on dicta in cases like Re 
D, Glass, Re S, and Re L and B.  More broadly, we would contend that our embodied integrity model 
can help shape the parameters of parental decision-making, and acts as a useful supplement to the 
current vogue for relational approaches. Our concern with such approaches is that thin understandings 
of relationality can collapse into little more than an acknowledgment of the importance of family 
relationships.  In so doing, they risk continuing to prioritise family integrity over the child’s interests 
and rights, thus reinforcing the parental power which has allowed parents to literally shape their 
children’s bodies.  Our embodied integrity approach would require instead that decision-making about 
a child’s best interests must start from the position that integrity is the core value which can only be 
over-ridden in exceptional cases. It thus makes embodiment central to the lives of children and all legal 
subjects. 
